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SPYING INC. 
 
Danielle Keats Citron∗ 
 
The latest spying craze is the “stalking app.” Once installed on someone’s cell phone, 
the stalking app can provide continuous access to the person’s calls, texts, snap chats, 
photos, calendar updates, and movements. Stalking apps destroy the privacy and 
confidentiality of cell phone activities. Domestic abusers and stalkers frequently turn to 
stalking apps because they are undetectable even to sophisticated phone owners.  
 
Business is booming for stalking app providers, even though their entire enterprise is 
arguably illegal. Federal and state wiretapping laws ban the manufacture, sale, or 
advertisement of devices knowing their design makes them primarily useful for the 
surreptitious interception of electronic communications. But those laws are rarely, if 
ever, enforced. Existing law may be too restrictive to make a real difference.  
 
A legal agenda is essential to combating the growth of stalking software. We need to update 
criminal and civil penalties facing providers. Record-keeping requirements could help 
decrease the demand for spyware. Private rights of action, if recognized, could help secure 
redress and deterrence. To increase the likelihood that the law will be enforced, states and 
localities need more training and digital forensic expertise. The private sector could 
reinforce these efforts by offering devices that can prevent the installation of spyware.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Private spying is a booming business. A rapidly growing sector of the 
spying economy involves the provision of spyware, a type of malware installed 
on someone’s device without knowledge or consent. Spyware providers earn 
monthly fees for providing secret, real-time access to a networked device 
owner’s communications and activities.1  
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Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society Project, 
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Nathaniel Gleicher, Margaret Hu, Robert Mosbacher, Chris Slobogin, Cindy Southworth, 
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, and David Vladeck for their insights. I’m grateful to Jeffrey Rabkin 
for reading drafts with his expert eye as well as to Venus Johnson, Robert Morgester, and the 
rest of Attorney General Kamala Harris’s Task Force on Cyber Exploitation for their helpful 
suggestions. The Georgetown-Maryland Privacy Working Group provided wonderful 
guidance. Cassie Mejias and Mariel Shutinya provided helpful research assistance. Susan 
McCarty, as always, was a superb reader, editor, and footnote fixer. The suggestions of the 
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1 Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used To Stalk, Control Domestic Violence Victims, National 
Public Radio, September 15, 2014. 
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The “stalking app” is the private spy’s current tool of choice.2 Search 
“cell phone spy” and an array of advertisements appear.3 “Worried about your 
spouse cheating? Track EVERY text, EVERY call and EVERY move they make 
using our EASY Cell Phone Spy Software,” explained one provider.4 
 
The privacy invasions enabled by surveillance software are breathtaking.  
Some stalking apps are devoted to tracking a phone owner’s geolocation data—
the street and city where a phone is present.5 Geolocation data tells us far more 
than points on a map. In her concurrence in United States v. Jones, Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor warned that monitoring a person’s public movements “reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”6  
 
Other stalking apps offer an even more revealing picture of someone’s 
daily activities. With these apps, subscribers can monitor everything phone 
owners do with their phones. In real time, subscribers can listen to a phone 
owner’s calls and video chats; they can view their texts, photos, calendars, 
contacts, and browsing habits.7 Targeted phones can be turned into bugging 
devices; conversations within a fifteen-foot radius of a phone are recorded and 
uploaded to the provider’s portal. As FlexiSpy tells subscribers, “Bug their 
room: listen in on their phone’s surroundings and listen in on what is really 
going on behind closed doors.”8  
 
A key selling point of stalking apps is their stealth nature.9 Subscribers 
are assured that once they download the spyware app to someone’s phone, the 
                                                          
2 Cahal Milmo, Exclusive: Abusers Using Spyware Apps to Monitor Partners Reaches ‘Epidemic 
Proportions,’ INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Dec. 26, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-abusers-using-spyware-
apps-to-monitor-partners-reaches-epidemic-proportions-9945881.html. 
3 See Appendix, Exhibit A. 
4 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and 
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Testimony of the Cindy 
Southworth, Vice Pres. of the National Network to End Domestic Violence on behalf of the 
Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women,  available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14SouthworthTestimony.pdf 
[hereinafter Southworth Testimony]. 
5 Id. 
6 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
7 Saiyai Sakawee, This App Lets Men with “Several Girlfriends” Spy on Their Significant Others’ 
Every Move, TECH IN ASIA (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.techinasia.com/app-lets-men-several-
girlfriends-spy-significant-others-move/.  
8 http://www.flexispy.com. 
9 Id. 
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phone owner will be unable to detect the spyware.10 Stalking apps are 
advertised as “100% undetectable.”11 FlexiSPY promises “total control of your 
partner’s phone without them knowing it. . . See exactly where they are, or 
were, at any given date or time.”12 Cellphone Spying stresses: “What this 
app . . . can do is capture that information for retrieval at a later date—without 
the target phone user ever knowing anything about it! As with all its 
functionality, the user of the targeted phone will have no clue that their phone 
has been compromised or that their data is getting leaked to somebody else.”13 
HelloSpy claims that its app “silently monitor[s] text messages, GPS locations, 
call details, photos, and social media activity.” Users are assured that the app 
“does not display any icons and appears on the device application database 
under different names (system processes), which leaves virtually no chance for 
the user to identify this software.”14  
 
Cyber stalking apps and their ilk thus enable continuous and secret 
tracking of a cell phone owner’s intimate conversations, medical appointments, 
online banking activity, intellectual musings, minute-to-minute movements, 
and far more. As the Court underscored in California v. Riley, with access to 
someone’s cell phone, a viewer can reconstruct the “sum of an individual’s 
private life.”15  
 
Although providers often emphasize that parents and employers could 
use their apps to check on children and employees, stalkers and domestic 
abusers are their targeted audience.16 National Network to End Domestic 
Violence’s Vice President Cindy Southworth explains that, “some developers 
try to mask their nefarious intentions by mentioning child safety or employee 
safety once or twice, but their true focus is obvious when they reiterate on 
every page how their products are completely hidden and work in stealth 
mode.”17  
 
                                                          
10 mSpyVIP, Cell Phone Spy – mSpy Review, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNbT0At4Tsg.  
11 Southworth Testimony, supra note.  
12 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and 
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Opening Statement of Chairman 
Franken, available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-
14FrankenStatement.pdf. 
13 How Do Cell Spying Apps Work?, CELLSPYINGHQ (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://cellspyinghq.com/how-do-cell-spying-programs-work/.  
14 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at 19. 
15 California v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). 
16 See Appendix, Exhibit B. 
17 Press Release, National Network to End Domestic Violence, Senate Bill Would Ban Stalking 
Apps and Save Women’s Lives (June 4, 2014), http://nnedv.org/news/4296-senate-bill-would-
ban-stalking-apps-and-save-women-s-lives.html.  
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If one digs at all, it becomes clear that stealth surveillance of ex-intimates 
is a key goal.18 Stalking apps are hailed as the “spy in [a cheating spouse’s] 
pocket.“19 FlexiSPY advertisements prominently feature a photo of a couple 
next to the message: “many spouses cheat. They all use cell phones. Their 
phones will tell you what they won’t.”20 The advertisement continues, 
“Women who do cheat usually do so in a well-planned and discrete [sic] 
fashion, making it exceedingly difficult for their man to know they’re being 
cuckolded. . . . Women are much more capable of looking you straight in the 
eye and lying.”21 A marketing video for a stalking app asked, “So you want to 
keep an eye on your loved one or your employees, because you suspect they’re 
hiding something and it might get too late?”22 Another app provider’s 
advertisement includes “a photo of a woman whose face was marked with ugly 
abrasions and whose forearm was held in the grip of a man.”23 mSpy 
emphasizes that its software app helps people catch cheating wives.24 
 
Much of this activity is illegal. Intercepting electronic communications 
without at least one party’s consent violates federal and state wiretap laws. In 
most states and at the federal level, cyber stalking is a crime.25 But bringing 
criminal law to bear against individual perpetrators is challenging. Spyware 
apps are hard to detect; so then is the criminal surveillance.  
 
Even when stalking victims suspect that their phones are being 
monitored, their complaints to law enforcement are seldom pursued. Police 
departments often lack the forensic equipment necessary to examine mobile 
                                                          
18 Cellphone Spying, a site about stealth spying on intimates, links to PhoneWatcher.net, which 
in turn links to the spyware provider mSpy. mSpy says that 40% of users are parents and 10 to 
15% are small businesses monitoring employees but is silent about the remaining 45 to 50% of 
its customers. Kate Knibbs, Smartphone Spying Startup Will Keep an Eye on NYC, DAILY DOT (Feb. 
27, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/mspy-goes-to-nyc/. In March 2014, mSpy’s 
website demonstrated the service with a man tracking the communications and whereabouts of 
his wife and son. E.J. Dickson, To Catch a Cheater: 6 Apps for Spying on Your Significant Other, 
DAILY DOT (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/love-surveillance-spying-
apps/. 
19 Id. 
20 FlexiSpy, http://www.flexispy.com. Under the caption “Catch Cheaters,” Flexispy asks, “Is 
your wife or husband cheating on you? For the sake of your mental and sexual health, you 
have a right to know if your partner is being responsible. Spy on their cellphones to know.” 
21 Milmo, supra note.  
22 Stealth Genie Official, StealthGenie - World's Most Powerful Cell Phone Spy Software, YOUTUBE 
(July 31, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YycVKHOCp0M&list=UUi2qZEeLu4x7-
eH70o52njQ  
23 Kim Zetter, The Criminal Indictment that Could Finally Hit Spyware Makers Hard, WIRED (Oct. 1, 
2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/stealthgenie-indictment/. 
24 mSpyVIP, supra note.  
25 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 123-25 (2014). 
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devices for stalking apps.26 Reports often go nowhere because domestic 
violence and stalking are low priorities for law enforcement. Police officers 
receive little training on the relevant laws and the technology necessary to 
investigate such crimes.27 Because both the law and the technology are not well 
understood, law enforcement does little beyond advising victims to get rid of 
their phones. Resources to fund digital forensic investigations are especially 
scarce at the state and local level. Then too, the lack of cooperation between 
jurisdictions may prevent the apprehension of stalkers.    
 
What about the parties responsible for providing spyware and other 
covert surveillance tools? Under federal law, it is a crime to manufacture, sell, 
or advertise a device knowing or having reason to know that the design of the 
device renders it “primarily useful” for the covert interception of electronic, 
wire, or oral communications. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia 
have similar criminal statutes. At least in theory then, the providers of stalking 
apps could face federal and state criminal charges if it can be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the apps are “primarily useful” for secret surveillance.  
 
The prosecution of businesses involved in the manufacture and sale of 
stalking apps could be a crucial deterrent, but that possibility has not yet been 
realized. There have been few, if any, state prosecutions against the entities 
providing covert surveillance tools and a modest number at the federal level. If 
law enforcement initiated more investigations, the law may only cover a 
narrow set of devices or tools: those whose design renders them “primarily 
useful” for the interception of electronic, wire, or oral communications. 
Existing law does not ban the interception of location data.  
 
Although the Federal Trade Commission has brought a handful of 
enforcement actions against spyware providers for engaging in unfair and 
deceptive trade practices, stalking app providers have paid little attention. 
Such services continue to proliferate; their ads brazenly appear online. 
 
                                                          
26 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and 
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Testimony of Detective Brian Hill, 
Criminal Investigations Division, Anoka County Sheriff’s Office, available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14HillTestimony.pdf  [hereinafter 
Hill Testimony]. 
27 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). The Attorney General of 
California Kamala Harris has been working hard to address this problem in her state. I’m 
working with her Task Force on Cyber Exploitation on efforts to educate law enforcement 
about cyber stalking. Funds are being diverted to enhance law enforcement’s digital forensic 
expertise in California. Telephone Interview with Special Attorney General Jeffrey Rabkin 
(notes on file with author). 
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Something more must be done. Software secretly tracking a phone’s 
activities exacts profound costs to privacy while serving no legitimate purpose. 
Aided by spyware, abusers can find victims who are desperately trying to 
escape them. Victims of domestic abuse have been beaten and killed. When 
victims learn that their phones are the source of their vulnerability, the 
emotional fallout is profound. Stalking victims lose their sense of personal 
safety. They experience anxiety at the thought of being under surveillance by 
their stalkers. New phones must be purchased and time spent devising new 
passwords and accounts.28 Many victims lack the resources to purchase new 
phones. If an abuser tracks a domestic violence victim to a shelter, other victims 
staying at the shelter are at risk, now and in the future.29  
 
Domestic abusers and stalkers are increasingly turning to surveillance 
software to terrorize victims. A Bureau of Justice Statistics study conducted in 
2006 estimated that 25,000 people are stalked via GPS annually.30 That number 
surely understates the problem given the increasing adoption of cell phones 
and availability of stalking apps.31 According to a 2012 survey of 750 victim 
services agencies, 75% of domestic violence survivors experience tracking of 
their location through their cell phones or a GPS device.32 A 2014 study 
sponsored by Digital Trust found that more than 50 percent of abusive partners 
used spyware or some other form of electronic surveillance to stalk victims.33 
The overall number of stalking victims is significant and growing: in 2009, the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that over 3.4 million individuals are 
stalked annually;34 in 2014, the Department of Justice’s Bea Hanson testified 
that 6.6 million people are stalked annually.35 
 
Despite the dangers, surveillance software remains widely available for 
purchase by domestic abusers and stalkers. The risks of stalking apps will only 
escalate over time as our smartphones are connected to even more revealing 
information, such as biometric measuring devices and home appliances.   
                                                          
28 Hill Testimony, supra note, at XX. 
29 Much thanks to Rachel Levinson-Waldman for her expertise and insights on these matters. 
30  Katrina Baum, Shanna Catalano, Michael Rand, and Kristina Rose, Stalking Victimization in 
the United States, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 224527 (January 9, 2009), 
8.  
31 The Department of Justice may no longer be a resource for data about GPS stalking. 
Unfortunately, the Bureau of Justice Statistics survey has eliminated inquiry into the prevalence 
of GPS stalking.   
32 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at XX. 
33 Milmo, supra note.  
34 Baum, supra note, at 8. 
35 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and 
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Testimony of Bea Hanson, Principal 
Deputy Dir., Department of Justice Office of Violence Against Women, available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14HansonTestimony.pdf. 
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This essay proposes a legal agenda aimed to curtail the enablers of 
private spies—the businesses manufacturing, selling, or advertising spyware 
and other stealth surveillance equipment. Given the difficulty of finding 
stalkers due to the surreptitious nature of surveillance tools, the producers of 
such software are a crucial source of punishment and deterrence. The question 
is how might we improve the law, its enforcement, and other non-legal efforts? 
 
 A legal agenda should include legal reforms. Current criminal law may 
be too restrictive to combat the stalking app industry. The provision of devices 
secretly collecting location data should be banned. Also, criminal law should 
extend to the purveyors of devices whose design renders them “useful” for 
secret surveillance. Another potential reform is to require app providers to 
collect records on subscribers so that private spies can be found and caught. On 
the civil side, individuals should be given a private right of action against the 
purveyors of cyber stalking software. 
 
Legal reform should be paired with efforts to enhance law’s enforcement. 
More resources should be dedicated to training law enforcement and to digital 
forensic expertise. Criminal law has no chance of serving as a deterrent if it is 
never pursued. State consumer protection agencies bring enforcement actions 
against spyware providers. 
 
To be clear about this paper’s scope, this essay does not address 
government surveillance. In a series of articles, David Gray and I have explored 
government’s mass data collection, analysis, and sharing.36 We have proposed 
a right to quantitative privacy to strike a better balance between individual and 
collective expectations of privacy and law enforcement’s interest in preventing, 
detecting, and prosecuting terrorism and crimes. This essay leaves aside the 
collection, use, and sharing of personal data for legitimate commercial ends, 
which I have explored in other work.37 
                                                          
36 David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); 
David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic 
Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); David Gray, Danielle Keats 
Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 745 (2013); Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total 
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013). See also Danielle 
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Surveillance State, HASTINGS 
L.J. (2011). 
37 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society, WASH. L. REV. (2014); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2011); Danielle Keats Citron, The 
Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection, in DEEP PACKET INSPECTION: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 
BY INDUSTRY EXPERTS (Office of the Privacy Comm’r of Can. 2009), available at 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2009/keats-citron_200903_e.asp; 
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Part I sets the stage with a brief history of the industry involved in the 
secret surveillance of individuals’ confidential communications. It discusses the 
development of tools facilitating the continuous, indiscriminate, and secret 
surveillance of individuals for private, criminal ends. Part II asks what current 
law does about the production of surveillance tools. It explores the gaps in 
legal protections and the under-enforcement of existing law. Part III offers a 
legal agenda to combat the problem of private spying. It calls for an expansion 
of criminal and civil law and for more training and resources to ensure the 
enforcement of existing laws. It wraps up by addressing potential non-legal 
strategies. 
 
I. THE PRIVATE SURVEILLANCE BUSINESS 
 
A. Evolution of the Spying Trade 
 
Human beings are inherently curious. Gossip has long been a common 
pastime.38 Predictably then, as soon as telegraphs and telephones became 
available for purchase, so did devices designed to intercept confidential 
telephone and telegraph communications.39 In the early 1900s, telephone 
wiretap devices were widely advertised and sold.40 Businesses and individuals 
bought them to spy on competitors, employees, and spouses.41  
 
Over time, spying tools grew in variety and sophistication.42 In the 1940s 
and 1950s, mail order catalogs sold location trackers, spy cameras, bugging 
devices, radio pills, and tiny tape recorders.43 Available for purchase were 
bugging devices hidden in martini olives, suitcase handles, earrings, and tie 
clasps. Miniature bugging devices could broadcast conversations to a receiver a 
block away.44 Parabolic microphones could pick up voices without being 
placed on the premises.45 Catalogs sought to avoid entanglement with the law 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the 
Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007). 
38 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET (2007). 
39 SAMUEL DASH, THE INTRUDERS: UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES FROM KING JOHN 
TO JOHN ASHCROFT 79 (2004). During the Civil War, military telegraph messages were 
routinely intercepted. Id. After the war’s end, telegraph operators got into the private 
wiretapping business. Id. 
40 Alan F. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Solution, 52 COLUM. L. 
REV. 165, 168 (1957).  
41 Id. 
42 DASH, supra note, at 85; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967). 
43 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 90, 98 (1967). 
44 MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 152 (1964). 
45 Berger, 388 U.S. at 47.  
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by warning buyers to use bugging tools “according to the laws of your 
community.”46 
 
The low cost of spying devices fueled their widespread adoption.47 
Businesses installed microphones in the walls of employee restrooms and 
desks.48 Model homes and car salesrooms were equipped with hidden bugs to 
allow salespeople to overhear the musings of prospective buyers.49 Husbands 
bugged their wives’ bedrooms and wiretapped their home phones, and wives 
wiretapped and bugged their husbands’ offices.50 
 
Early bugging devices faced objections and legal restrictions. As the next 
Part explores, states and Congress barred nonconsensual wiretapping, but the 
laws were limited in their reach and hardly ever enforced. 
 
 B. Private Spying 2.0 
 
The martini listening device, telephone bug, and parabolic microphone 
are quaint by modern standards. Today’s spying tools can provide a totalizing 
picture of someone’s daily activities, from the sacred to the quotidian. In a 
dragnet style, they produce a continuous record of a person’s movements, 
communications, online browsing, reading habits, searches, snap chats, videos, 
and more. Thanks to falling storage costs, it is cheap to preserve a continuous 
record of our intellectual, economic, political, social, and physical pursuits.  
 
Cell phones are gold mines for the spying business. Stalking apps 
generate a precise, comprehensive record of a cell phone owner’s activities, 
communications, and location in real time. Every time a person’s phone 
generates media content, the content is uploaded to the spyware subscriber’s 
account for remote viewing. Through a web portal, users can view the person’s 
calendar entries, Facebook posts, address book, photos, videos, online activities, 
text messages, call logs, emails, snap chats, and location. The watcher can turn 
the person’s phone into a bugging device and pick up their conversations.51 
Cell phone owners will have no reason to suspect the surveillance because 
spyware is designed to be undetectable.52  
 
                                                          
46 BRENTON, supra note, at 155. 
47 To the tune of $250. Id. at 153. 
48 DASH, supra note, at 84. 
49 Id. at 85. 
50 Id. 
51 Knibbs, supra note.  
52 United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, 
United States v. Hammad Akbar, Civil No. 1:14 CV 1273 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2014). 
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In the near future, far more information will be linked to mobile 
personal devices. Already on the market are fitness exercise bands that link to 
our phones, tracking our heart rate and exercise. Soon, cell phones will be 
connected to our home appliances, alarms, and more. 
 
We have some sense of the businesses involved in spyware.53 Let’s 
consider a few examples. mSpy, a UK company with a New York office, sells a 
mobile app that facilitates the stealth monitoring of a person’s phone activity. 
According to mSpy, 74% of its users are male. The most active users are 
between 35 to 44 years old, and 53% live in the United States. Texans and 
Californians drive the most traffic to mSpy’s website.54 mSpy says that parents 
make up 40% of its users and that employers constitute 10 to 15% of its user 
base. mSpy has said nothing about the remaining 45 or 50% of its customers. In 
March 2014, mSpy’s website demonstrated the service with a man tracking the 
communications and whereabouts of his wife and son.55 
 
  Highster Mobile allows users to “secretly track and spy on virtually any 
cell phone quickly and easily completely undetected.”56 On YouTube, a 
Highster subscriber hailed the spyware for helping him catch his wife cheating. 
“Without this software, I would not have been able to know that my suspicions 
about her cheating was correct.”57 A Highster-sponsored user review page 
included several reviews applauding the app’s utility in stalking intimates. One 
person wrote, “It doesn’t work very well, but i did receive enough text 
messages to know she is cheating on me, not with 1 guy but 3, what a 
woman!!”58 Still another said, “Highster Mobile literally changed my life after I 
found my suspicions were correct. I’m now living in a different country and 
having the time of my life. I am free!!!”59 YouTube users reviewing the app said 
it is great to use to watch your “cheating spouse” or your kids.60  
 
                                                          
53 Just to name just a few: iSpyoo, SpyBubble, Highster, mSpy, Cell Phone Spy, and Spy to 
Mobile. Leah Wightley, Highster Mobile Review, YOUTUBE (Aug. 19, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2Bs5ABMRoA.  
54 Molly Mulshine, Watch What You Text: iPhone Surveillance Startup Moves to NYC, BETABEAT 
(Feb. 26, 2014), http://betabeat.com/2014/02/watch-what-you-text-iphone-surveillance-
startup-moves-to-nyc/. 
55 Dickson, supra note.  
56 Remote Cell Phone Tracker and Spy, HIGHSTER MOBILE, http://www.highstermobi.com (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
57 louiseramirez88, Best Cell Phone Spying Tool, How I Find Out that my Wife was CHEATING!!, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X0CIhdDbChY.  
58 Highster Mobile Reviews, TOP 10 SPY SOFTWARE REVIEW, 
http://www.top10spysoftware.com/review/highstermobile.  
59 Id.  
60 Highster Mobile Review, Highster Mobile 3: What You Need to Know Before You Buy Highster 
Mobile, YOUTUBE (Jan. 29, 2014),  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUvvVx06iLw. 
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C. Perils of Spyware 
 
Spyware apps enable stalkers and domestic abusers to terrorize victims. 
Physical harm is a serious peril when abusers have access to victims’ activities 
and whereabouts. A woman fled her abuser who was living in Kansas.61 
Because her abuser had installed a cyber stalking app on her phone, her abuser 
knew that she had moved to Elgin, Illinois. He tracked her to a shelter and then 
a friend’s home where he assaulted her and tried to strangle her.62 In another 
case, a woman tried to escape her abusive husband, but because he had 
installed a stalking app on her phone, he was able to track down her and her 
children. The man murdered his two children.63 In 2013, a California man, 
using a spyware app, tracked a woman to her friend’s house and assaulted 
her.64 
 
In addition to the serious physical risks posed by abusers’ access to 
spyware, imagine the chilling of expression and anxiety that ensues when 
stalking victims discover that their mobile devices have been providing their 
abuser with total access to every communication, search conducted, photo 
taken, book read on a reading app, snapchat shared, social network message 
received, activity on dating apps, and step taken—for days, weeks, and 
months. Victims have told law enforcement that they no longer feel 
comfortable using their phones for fear that their abuser has somehow 
reinstalled spyware on their phones. They can become paranoid about using 
networked technologies for work, socializing, and public conversations, lest 
their abuser track them down. They experience distress about being watched.65 
 
That sort of chilling implicates our intellectual privacy.66 Once 
individuals become aware that their communications have been under 
surveillance, they may internalize the notion of being listened to and watched. 
Individual development is inevitably chilled in the face of unwanted 
monitoring.  
                                                          
61 Franken Statement, supra note, at 2.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at 12. 
65 Studies have shown that people experience anxiety about being watched and misunderstood. 
Stuart A. Karabenick & John R. Knapp, Effects of Computer Privacy on Help-Seeking, 18 J. APPLIED. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 461 (1988). 
66 NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (forthcoming 2015); JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, 
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 141 (2012); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Julie 
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1425-26 (2000). 
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Stalking apps can be used to facilitate financial crimes. For instance, they 
can be used to steal sensitive personal information like social security numbers 
and passwords to assist in identity theft. Secretly installed spyware provides 
users access to a victim’s bank passwords that can be used to empty accounts.67 
If victims lose their financial cushion, the harm that they experience will be far 
worse and their options more limited.68 
 
II. LAW’S ROLE COMBATING SPYING INC. 
 
“Few threats to liberty exist . . . greater than that posed by . . . eavesdropping 
devices.”69 
 
 Congress and half of the states have adopted bans on the business side 
of illegal eavesdropping, but the enforcement of those laws has been lackluster. 
This Part begins by laying out some key developments in wiretapping law. 
Then, it highlights federal and state prohibitions on the manufacture, sale, and 
advertisement of certain surveillance devices. The enforcement of those laws 
and their limits are explored. This Part ends by discussing the role that 
consumer protection agencies have begun to play in curtailing the production 
of spyware. 
 
A. Historical Development of Wiretapping Laws 
 
In the mid-nineteenth century, a handful of states banned surreptitious 
wiretapping of telegraph communications. California passed the first criminal 
prohibition in 1862.70 Telegraph wiretapping bans were soon extended to 
include wiretaps on telephones.71  
 
The Supreme Court heard its first wiretapping case in 1928. In Olmstead 
v. United States, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, ruled that 
government interception of private telephone communications did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures.72 The Court reasoned that “projected voices” did not constitute 
“actual physical invasions” of the home warranting Fourth Amendment 
                                                          
67 Preliminary Injunctive Order, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy Software LLC, and 
Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/11/081128cyberspypi.pdf.  
68 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at 15. 
69 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967). 
70 Id. at 45-46.  
71 Berger, 388 U.S. at 45-46. California extended its prohibition of telegraph wiretapping to 
telephone wiretapping in 1905. DASH, supra note, at 81. 
72 Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
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protection. Because government agents cut into defendant’s telephone wires 
outside his home and had not trespassed inside it, no Fourth Amendment 
violation had occurred, the Court held. That federal law enforcement had 
violated state wiretapping law was irrelevant.  
 
As the Court noted in Olmstead, Congress could ban warrantless 
wiretaps to fill in the gaps left by the Constitution.73 Federal lawmakers did just 
that in the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Section 605 of the 
Communications Act banned the interception of radio or wire communications 
and the disclosure of the content of such communications absent the consent of 
one of the parties. The use of devices to secretly record face-to-face 
communications in private places was not banned.74  
 
As a practical matter, the Communications Act offered scant protection 
against wiretapping. The Department of Justice interpreted Section 605 to mean 
that law enforcement could engage in wiretapping if it did not divulge material 
obtained via wiretaps to others.75 Because that interpretation was backed by 
judicial decisions, law enforcement regularly used wiretapping equipment in 
investigations. Private parties rarely faced prosecution under either federal or 
state law because it seemed difficult to justify criminal charges against 
individuals when law enforcement engaged in the same activity.76  
 
In 1967, two Supreme Court decisions—Katz v. United States77 and Berger 
v. New York78—changed the trajectory of electronic surveillance law. In those 
cases, the Supreme Court overturned Olmstead, ruling that electronic 
surveillance constituted a search and seizure governed by the Fourth 
Amendment. Under Katz, surveillance focused on the interception of a few 
conversations was constitutionally acceptable if the interception was approved 
                                                          
73 277 U.S. at 465. Justice Brandeis wrote a powerful dissent that took the majority to task for 
linking Fourth Amendment protection to outmoded property rights. Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). A property-based approach failed to protect citizens from procedures that might 
not require the “force and violence” necessary to invade property, but nonetheless 
compromised the sanctity of citizens’ thoughts, beliefs, emotions as well as the “individual 
security” they invested in activities like telephone conversations. Id. at 473-74, 478-79. As Justice 
Brandeis underscored, telephone communications are more private and confidential than 
tangible objects in the home. Compared to telephone wiretaps, general warrants and writs of 
assistance were “but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression.” Fourth Amendment 
understandings needed to evolve to address scientific advances that permitted government 
agents to invade our most private and intimate information without physically intruding on 
the home. 
74 DASH, supra note, at 83. 
75 Westin, supra note, at 177. 
76 Westin, supra note, at 179, 186. 
77 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
78 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
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by a judge and based on a special showing of need.79 By contrast, lengthy, 
continuous, and indiscriminate electronic surveillance violated the Fourth 
Amendment.80 
 
Katz involved an investigation of a man allegedly running an illegal 
betting operation. Agents listened to the man’s calls by attaching a suction 
microphone to a telephone booth’s roof. Katz was convicted based on evidence 
gathered by the microphone. The Court held that using a listening device to 
monitor telephone conversations in a public phone booth constituted a Fourth 
Amendment “search.” In rejecting the trespass requirement, the Court declared 
that, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”81 The Court found 
that conversations in telephone booths deserve Fourth Amendment protection 
because citizens expect that their telephone conversations are just as secure 
from public review as their daily routines in the home.82 The Court noted that 
phone booths function as spaces of aural repose.83 Citizens could reasonably 
expect that their conversations in telephone booths would not be monitored by 
“uninvited ear[s],” even if they can be seen by “intruding eye[s].” Declining to 
extend Fourth Amendment protection would unsettle these broadly held 
expectations and raise the specter of a surveillance state.84 In Berger, the Court 
made clear that “the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication 
constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual.”85 The Court held 
that wiretapping statutes needed to include special privacy protections for 
governmental monitoring to pass constitutional muster because the 
indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance devices was reminiscent of the 
reviled general warrant.86 
 
In the shadow of Berger and Katz, Congress passed the Title III Wiretap 
Act of 1968 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.87 
Title III laid out a regime of protections “to compensate for the uniquely 
                                                          
79 James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap 
Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65 (1997). 
80 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
81 389 U.S. at 351. 
82 Id. at 351-52. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 354-59. 
85 Berger, 388 U.S. at 64. 
86 Berger, 388 U.S. at 47 (ruling wiretapping raised special Fourth Amendment concerns because 
it involved continuous intrusions, searches, and seizures and the indiscriminate monitoring of 
communications over a period of time without connection to the crime under investigation 
unlike the limited intrusion of a traditional search). 
87 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act extended the Title III’s protections to wireless voice 
communications and voice communications of a non-voice nature, such as e-mail or other 
computer-to-computer transmissions. 
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intrusive aspects of electronic surveillance.”88 Law enforcement had to meet 
stringent warrant requirements to intercept telephone calls over the wires. Law 
enforcement could obtain wiretap orders only on a showing of special need, a 
predicate felony offense, and high-level Justice Department or state approval.89 
Wiretap orders had to be narrowly tailored and time limited.90 Officers had to 
“minimize” the interception of innocent conversations.91 Such minimization 
was deemed essential to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement, making up for the fact that law enforcement was getting access to 
all of the target’s communications including those unconnected to the crime 
under investigation.92 Wiretaps falling short of these requirements were 
banned.93 
 
B. Cutting Off the Source: Section 2512 and Analogous State Statutes 
 
Private individuals engaged in secret wiretapping could face criminal 
charges. Under Title III, it is a felony to intercept electronic communications 
unless one of the parties to a communication consented to the interception.94 In 
passing Title III, federal lawmakers recognized that private spies would be 
difficult to identify. After all, eavesdropping equipment is designed to ensure 
that those under surveillance do not know about it.  
 
To enhance Title III’s deterrent effect, Congress included a provision 
covering those involved in the manufacture, sale, and advertisement of covert 
surveillance devices. The idea was to “dry up the source of equipment highly 
useful for surveillance.”95 Section 2512 made it a crime to intentionally 
manufacture, sell, or advertise a device knowing or having reason to know that 
its design renders it “primarily useful” for the surreptitious interception of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications.96 Defendants face fines of not more 
than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than five years or both.  
                                                          
88 Dempsey, supra note, at 71. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 379 (2014) (discussing provisions of Title III that provide exceptions 
when wiretapping is legal without a court order and set forth procedures for lawful 
interception pursuant to a court order).  
89 Kerr, supra note, at 380. 
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), (5) (2012). 
91 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 
92 Dempsey, supra note, at 70. 
93 For a thoughtful exploration of the significance of Title III and Katz, see Susan Freiwald, A 
First Principles Approach of Communications’ Privacy, 2007 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. (2007).  
94 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). Most states follow this approach, though 12 states criminalize the 
interception of electronic communications unless both parties to the communication consent to 
the interception. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 Ill. L. Rev. 1417, 
1485 (2009). 
95 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2183 (1968). 
96 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (2012). 
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Section 2512 covers a “narrow category of devices whose principal use is 
likely to be for wiretapping or eavesdropping.”97 A surveillance device must be 
“sufficiently invasive or devious in purpose to warrant criminal prosecution.”98 
The inquiry focuses on the degree to which a device’s components render it 
useful for the secret interception of communications.99 Disclaimers that 
customers should be advised of the law do not immunize defendants from 
conviction.100 A defendant cannot avoid penalties under Section 2512 “by 
surrounding himself with disclaimers and closing his eyes to the [surreptitious] 
nature and use of the devices.”101   
 
Section 2512’s safe harbor exempts entities that supply surveillance 
equipment to government agencies or communication providers.102 For 
instance, the manufacture of network packet sniffers seemingly falls outside of 
Section 2512 because the device helps broadband providers detect network 
intrusion attempts, identify misuse by internal and external users, monitor 
network usage, and filter suspect content from network traffic. The provision of 
packet sniffers does not run afoul of the law because it is used in the normal 
course of a communication provider’s business. 
 
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted similar 
statutes.103 Most state laws track the exact language of Section 2512, including 
its safe harbor provisions. Pennsylvania makes it a felony to intentionally 
                                                          
97 United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News at 2112, 2183-84). Although Title III did not provide examples of devices on 
lawmakers’ minds, the Senate Report accompanying the statute included a non-exhaustive list 
of banned devices like the martini olive transmitter, spike mike, and microphones hidden in 
pens and calculators. 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2112, 2184. 
98 Shriver, 989 F.2d at 906. 
99 United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 1992). That inquiry focuses on the 
“particular characteristics of the device at issue.” Id. Expert testimony may be useful to prove 
that a device is primarily designed for stealth use. United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 602 
(C.D. Ill. 1986). 
100 United States v. Brio, 143 F.3d 1421, 1429 (11th Cir. 1998). 
101 United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 606 (C.D. Ill. 1986). 
102 18 U.S.C. § 2512(2)(a)(b) (2012). 
103 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-34; CAL. PENAL CODE § 635 (West); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-302 
(West); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41s (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2403 (West); D.C. 
CODE § 23-543. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.04 (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-63 (West); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 803-43 (West); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6703 (West); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:1304; ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 710; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-403 (West); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 750.539f (West); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.03 (West); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:3; 
N.J.S.A. § 2A:156A–5; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-288 (West); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-
03 (West); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.3 (West); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5705 (West); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-35-24 (West); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-55; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 
(West); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-5 (West); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1D-4 (West). 
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manufacture, sell, distribute, or advertise an “electronic, mechanical or other 
device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device 
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of a 
wire, electronic or oral communication.”104 Maine’s statute is broader: it 
proscribes the sale of “any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus designed 
or commonly used for the interception of wire or oral communications.”105 
 
As technology has evolved, gaps in the law have become apparent. 
Federal and state laws do not cover surveillance tools devoted to the secret 
collection of location data. As U.S. Senator Al Franken has explained and has 
worked to change, “there is no federal law banning the secret collection of 
location data.”106 At the state level, the rare exception is section 637.7 of the 
California Penal Code, which states that “[n]o person or entity in this state shall 
use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a 
person.”107 This provision (and the few others like it) likely has no application 
to cyber stalking apps because it only covers electronic tracking devices 
“attached” to a vehicle or movable thing.108 
 
We have seen some prosecutions of individuals responsible for the 
production of devices primarily designed to facilitate the stealth interception of 
communications. At the federal level, spy stores have been convicted of selling 
voice recorders and transmitters hidden in pens, light bulbs, wall plugs, and 
calculators.109 Defendants have been imprisoned for selling wireless telephone 
microphones whose small size made them easy to hide and whose design 
permitted remote, clandestine monitoring.110  
 
Nonetheless, prosecutions remain extremely rare. Despite the increasing 
prevalence of spyware, federal prosecutors have only brought a handful of 
cases.111 In 2005, a San Diego student, Carlos Perez-Melara, was indicted for 
                                                          
104 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5705 (West). 
105 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 710. 
106 Press Release, Sen. Al Franken, After Pressure from Senator Franken, Federal Officials Take 
Action Against Dangerous “Stalking Apps” (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2960.  
107 CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West); Del. Code Ann. Title 11, section 1335(a)(8); Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. 16.06.  
108 CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West). 
109 United States v. Brio, 143 F.3d 1421, 1430 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 
951 F. Supp. 450, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
110 United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 603 (C.D. Ill. 1986). 
111 The first case involving spyware was brought in 1997 against Spy Shops International. The 
United States Attorney’s Office in Miami, with Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Mosbacher in the 
lead, pursued 2512 charges against the defendant for importing and selling spyware designed 
to be primarily used to intercept electronic communications surreptitiously. I am grateful to 
Robert Mosbacher for talking to me about the case.  
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manufacturing, selling, and advertising spyware programs called “EmailPI” 
and “Lover Spy.”112 The program was designed to “catch a cheating lover.” It 
sent victims an electronic greeting card that, once opened, would secretly 
install a keystroke logger and data-gleaning software. The program captured 
email, passwords, documents, and browser histories and sent reports of them 
to users on a regular basis. Users could take control of the watched person’s 
computer, including turning on the webcam and deleting or altering files.113 
The case, however, fizzled after the defendant fled the country.  
 
Nearly ten years elapsed before federal prosecutors charged another 
spyware producer under Section 2512. In September 2014, federal prosecutors 
brought Section 2512 charges against StealthGenie’s CEO Hammad Akbar.114 
StealthGenie’s spyware app secretly intercepted communications to and from 
mobile phones.115 The company’s marketing material explained that its app is 
“100% undetectable” and “runs in the background of the mobile phone without 
disturbing any of the other functions running.”116 StealthGenie promised to 
help subscribers “uncover the truth” by “secretly monitoring all the activities of 
your loved one or employee, and let you know their location at all times.” 117 
The federal indictment alleged that the app’s target population was “spousal 
cheat: Husband/Wife of boyfriend/girlfriend suspecting their other half of 
cheating or any other suspicious behavior or if they just want to monitor 
them.”118 A federal judge issued a temporary restraining order authorizing the 
FBI to disable the site hosting StealthGenie.119  
 
Law enforcement has been slow to prosecute the distributors of spyware 
despite their life-threatening implications and illegal nature.120 At the state 
level, criminal law’s enforcement has been virtually nonexistent.121 Why so few 
state and federal prosecutions?  
 
                                                          
112 China Martens, ‘Loverspy’ Creator Indicted, On the Run, IDG NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 29, 2005). 
113 Martens, supra note. 
114 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pakistani Man Indicted for Selling 
StealthGenie Spyware App (Sept. 29, 2014). 
115 Id. Federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia brought the case because 
StealthGenie is hosted at a data center in Ashburn, Virginia. Id. 
116 Id. 
117 StealthGenie Official, supra note.  
118 Zetter, supra note. 
119 FBI Arrests StealthGenie Mobile Spyware App Maker, Disables Website, FBI NEWS BLOG (Sept. 20, 
2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/fbi-arrests-stealthgenie-spyware-app-maker-
disables-site. 
120 Zetter, supra note.  
121 My research assistants and I searched Westlaw and Lexis for state law cases involving the 
prosecution of providers of stealth spying equipment and could not find any.  
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One reason for the low number of prosecutions may be the difficulty in 
proving that a device is primarily designed for the secret interception of 
electronic communications.122 Esteemed privacy advocate James Dempsey 
blames the small number of Section 2512 prosecutions on the fact that it is hard 
to demonstrate that equipment is “primarily” designed for stealth interception 
of communications.123  
 
Another reason is that law enforcement generally devotes too few 
resources to combating domestic violence and stalking. State and local police 
departments receive little training about relevant laws and technologies. Law 
enforcement’s lackluster response is also related to the view that cyber stalking 
is no big deal.124 Law enforcement officers often advise victims that they have 
more important matters to address, such as murder and child porn, and lack 
the resources for cyber stalking cases.125  
 
Additional problems include the fact that cyber stalking and domestic 
abuse are under-reported. Because victims do not think that law enforcement 
will take their complaints seriously, they often do not seek out its help.126 There 
is also a significant lack of digital forensic resources resulting in proof problems 
for prosecutors. Lastly, as has long been true, society has difficulty in 
quantifying the harm caused by privacy violations, which leads to failure by 
law enforcement to prioritize this type of enforcement. 
 
We cannot be sure of the precise reasons for the under-enforcement of 
criminal law. But we can confidently say that criminal law has been rarely used 
to punish the production of equipment that has little use beyond the stealth 
interception of communications data. 
 
C. Consumer Protection Laws 
 
Stalking app producers may be running afoul of consumer protection 
statutes. Under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC can 
seek injunctive or other equitable relief against companies engaging in unfair 
                                                          
122 Dempsey, supra note, at 111.  
123 Dempsey, supra note, at 111. 
124 CITRON, supra note, at 85.  
125 Amanda Hess, A Former FBI Agent on Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute Gamergate Trolls, SLATE 
(Oct. 17, 1014), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/17/gamergate_threats_why_it_s_so_hard_t
o_prosecute_the_people_targeting_zoe.html. Although law enforcement agencies often dismiss 
cyber stalking victims because they claim they are too busy investigating terrorism or murder, 
FBI statistics tell another story. From 2010-2013, the top three crimes pursued by the FBI 
involved aggravated assault, drug crimes, and larceny theft. 
126 CITRON, supra note, at 183-84. 
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or deceptive acts or practices. Acts are considered unfair if they cause or are 
likely to cause substantial injury that consumers cannot reasonably avoid and 
their countervailing benefits to consumers or competition does not outweigh 
the costs.127  
Under its Section 5(a) authority, the FTC has brought charges against 
spyware and mobile apps engaged in the surreptitious collection of 
communications data. In 2012, the FTC alleged that DesignerWare LLC, a 
company providing spyware to rent-to-own computer providers, engaged in 
unfair and deceptive practices. The company’s software secretly logged a 
computer user’s keystrokes, photographed anyone in view of the computer’s 
webcam, and tracked the computer’s geolocation.128 In 2013, Designerware 
entered into a consent decree with the FTC, agreeing not to gather data from 
computers without giving clear and prominent notice of such tracking at the 
time the computer is rented and without obtaining affirmative express 
consent.129 
Similarly, in 2008, the FTC filed a suit against CyberSpy Software, which 
sold a keylogger program called RemoteSpy.130 RemoteSpy could be disguised 
as an innocuous attachment to an email. Once an email recipient clicked on the 
attachment, the program would be installed onto the recipient’s computer. The 
spyware generated records of all of the keystrokes typed, images captured, 
passwords provided, and sites visited on the infected computers. To access the 
information intercepted and gathered by the spyware, users would log into a 
site maintained by the defendants.131 CyberSpy Software urged its users to 
employ stealth email services to send the software so recipients could not 
identify them.132  
 
In 2010, the defendants entered into a consent decree with the FTC, in 
which they agreed to refrain from promoting, selling, or distributing software 
                                                          
127 15 U.S.C. § 43(n) (2012). 
128 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130415designerwarecm
pt.pdf 
129 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130415designerwaredo.
pdf.  
130 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Federal Trade Commission 
v. CyberSpy Software, LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2008). 
131 Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Spyware Seller Settles FTC Charges; Order Bars 
Marketing of Keylogger Spyware for Illegal Uses (June 2, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2010/06/spyware-seller-settles-ftc-charges-order-bars-marketing-
keylogger.  
132 Preliminary Injunctive Order, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy Software LLC, and 
Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008). 
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that would be installed on computers without the knowledge and express 
consent of the computers’ owners.133 The defendants agreed to install a popup 
notice that clearly and prominently disclosed the function of the software to 
computer owners.134 They also pledged to retain records about their customers, 
including names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, payments, and 
items purchased.135  
 
Beyond spyware, the FTC has signaled that apps collecting geolocation 
data owe special duties to their users.136 The FTC brought an action against a 
flashlight app developer for failing to notify users before the app was 
downloaded that their geolocation information would be collected and shared 
with third parties. The resulting consent decree required the defendant to 
provide a separate notice and opt-in consent to consumers before collecting 
geolocation information. The lesson to providers is that consumers must be 
clearly notified about the collection and sharing of geolocation data, the 
reasons for the collection and sharing, and the identity of third parties with 
whom geolocation data will be shared. 
 
As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have powerfully argued, the 
FTC has laid down common law principles for the protection of consumer 
privacy.137 FTC settlements in cases involving Designerware LLC, CyberSpy 
Software,138 Aaron’s Rental,139 and Android Flashlight app140 make clear the 
agency’s view that spyware and mobile apps collecting communications and 
geolocation data should not operate without express consumer consent. The 
FTC, however, can take us only so far given its limited resources and power. 
                                                          
133 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy 
Software LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010). 
134 Id. 
135 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy 
Software LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010). 
136 See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015). 
137 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). 
138 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy 
Software LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010).  
139 Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Aaron’s Rent-to-Own Chain Settles FTC Charges that 
It Enabled Computer Spying by Franchisees (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2013/10/aarons-rent-own-chain-settles-ftc-charges-it-enabled-
computer.  
140 Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC 
Charges It Deceived Consumer (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/12/android-flashlight-app-developer-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived.  
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The agency cannot issue fines under Section 5.141 Only if companies violate 
settlement orders can the FTC pursue them for monetary penalties.142  
 
What about state Attorneys General and state consumer protection 
agencies? Under state unfair consumer practice acts (often called little-FTC 
Acts), Attorneys General can seek civil penalties as well as injunctive relief 
against spyware app providers’ unfair and deceptive consumer practices. 
Unfortunately, far too little attention has been paid to the issue on the state 
level. 
 
There are important exceptions. The Attorney General of California 
Kamala Harris, for instance, has been an aggressive advocate for online 
privacy.143 She issued the guidance document “Privacy on the Go” with 
recommendations for mobile apps to safeguard consumer privacy.144 A 
prominent goal of the AG’s study was the minimization of consumer surprise. 
AG Harris’s report called upon mobile app providers to ensure just-in-time 
notice about the collection of personal information to reduce the unexpected 
collection of consumer data.145 In 2012, AG Harris created a privacy 
enforcement task force, which has filed enforcement actions against mobile app 
developers to inform users what personal information they were collecting.146  
California’s eCrime Unit has pursued computer intrusion criminal 
prosecutions.147  
 
                                                          
141 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 854 (5th ed. 2014). 
142 If companies violate the terms of a final order issued by the FTC, then they could be liable 
for penalties up to $16,000 per violation. Section 5(l) of the FTC Act. 
143 Jason M. Crawford, State AGs and Online Privacy: Trends We Saw in 2013, LAW 360 (Dec. 6, 
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/493366/state-ags-and-online-privacy-trends-we-saw-
in-2013; Divonne Smoyer & Aaron Lancaster, State AGs: The Most Important Regulators in the 
US?, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Nov. 26, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/state-ags-
the-most-important-regulators-in-the-us/. Of late, state Attorneys General have made 
consumer privacy a priority including Connecticut, Maryland, Texas, New York, and others. 
144 KAMALA D. HARRIS, PRIVACY ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE 
ECOSYSTEM (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf.  
145 Id.  
146 Press Release, California Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Notifies 
Mobile App Developers of Non-Compliance with California Privacy Law (Oct. 30, 2012), 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-notifies-mobile-
app-developers-non-compliance. 
147 For instance, California’s Department of Justice prosecuted George Bronk for hacking into 
women’s email and Facebook accounts to steal their nude photos. Bronk sent the nude photos 
to the women’s email contacts. Nina Mandell, Facebook Stalker Turned Email Hacker Sentenced to 
Four Years in Prison: Sent Nude Photos of Victims, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 24, 2011), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/facebook-stalker-years-prison-article-1.156894.  
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Much more should be done on the state level to combat stalking apps 
and their ilk. 
 
III. NEXT STEPS 
 
This Part lays out a plan of action. The first step focuses on potential 
legal reform. The second sketches out possibilities to enhance the enforcement 
of existing laws. The last calls for private efforts to combat cyber stalking apps.  
  
A. Updating the Law 
 
Let’s consider potential criminal law reforms. In 2014, Senator Al 
Franken proposed the Location Privacy Protection Act (LPPA). The impetus 
behind the bill was the rise of cyber stalking apps and their enablement of 
domestic violence and stalking. A section of the LPPA would extend Section 
2512’s coverage to devices that collect geolocation information.148 Congress and 
state lawmakers should adopt this proposal. National domestic violence 
groups, consumer advocacy groups, the FTC, and the Department of Justice 
support the extension of Section 2512 to geolocation data, and for good reason 
given the risks accompanying the disclosure of location data.149  
 
Section 2512 and similar state laws also should be broadened to cover 
devices whose design renders them “useful” for secret interception and 
collection of electronic, wire, and oral communications and geolocation data. 
The more demanding “primarily useful” standard should be jettisoned as it 
erects an unnecessary barrier to criminal penalties.150 Prosecutors may be 
reluctant to pursue Section 2512 charges because it is hard to prove that their 
design renders them “primarily useful” for secret surveillance. The “primarily 
useful” standard allows defendants to point to a device’s legitimate uses (e.g., 
parents keeping tabs on their children) as cover for its illegitimate ones.151 This 
                                                          
148 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014, S. 2171, 113th Cong. § 6 (2014) (prohibiting 
development and distribution of stalking apps). 
149 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and 
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014) (Statements of Bea Hanson, 
Principal Deputy Dir., Department of Justice Office on Violence Against Women, and Jessica 
Rich, Dir., FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection); Press Release, Senator Franken’s ‘Stalking 
Apps’ Bill One Step Closer to Becoming Law (Dec. 13, 2012), 
https://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=hot_topic&id=2254. 
150 Dempsey, supra note, at 111. 
151 As Senator Franken explained at the Senate Privacy, Technology, and Law subcommittee 
hearing on the proposed Location Privacy Protection Act, a stalking ware provider focused its 
advertising on people who suspected their intimates of cheating. Once it became clear that his 
office was investigating stalking apps, the company changed its advertising to focus on uses by 
employers and parents. http://www.c-span.org/video/?319758-1/privacy-location-stalking-
apps. 
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tough standard has permitted spying businesses to flourish even if they market 
their spying software as “100% undetectable.”  
 
Rather than the “primarily userful” standard, federal and state 
wiretapping statutes should cover the provision of devices “designed for” the 
stealth interception and collection of communications and geolocation data. 
What makes a device highly likely to invade privacy and enable stalking is its 
covert nature. We do not need proof that a tool’s design renders it “primarily 
useful” for stealth interception and collection to punish its provision. That a 
tool is designed to accomplish surveillance in an undetectable manner is what 
makes it illegitimate.152 It should be illegal to manufacture, sell, or advertise 
software designed to covertly intercept communications and location data.  
 
Would eliminating the “primarily useful” requirement deter the 
production of devices with legitimate uses? Hardly. As NNEDV’s Cindy 
Southworth has argued, apps engaged in legitimate monitoring—such as the 
parent worried about a child’s location or the employer concerned about an 
employee’s misuse of her phone—need not disguise their presence.153 A parent 
can locate a child if the cell phone’s app database shows that the location app is 
running. The same is true for employers who want to check on employees’ 
activities during work hours.  
 
Also, apps that do not hide their presence would help ensure that 
employers themselves do not run afoul of wiretapping laws. Suppose that an 
employer owns the cell phones that it provides to employees. The employer 
loads spyware apps on the phones. In states with two-party consent wiretap 
laws, the employer is at risk for prosecution if employees using the phones talk 
to others on the phone without getting their consent to being monitored.154  
 
                                                          
152 See Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1327, 1401 (2008) (comparing the DMCA to Section 2512 and arguing that “[i]f one 
characteristic of a tool is especially pernicious and unlikely to be useful for widespread, 
legitimate use, a narrow law can be written criminalizing the creation or distribution of that 
tool”). 
153 Grant Gross, Mobile Spying Apps Fuel Domestic Violence, U.S. Senator Says, PC WORLD (June 4, 
2014), 
http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/546855/mobile_spying_apps_fuel_domestic_violenc
e_us_senator_says/. 
154 An employer’s use of spyware would be legitimate under federal and most state 
wiretapping laws if the employer monitored the employee’s phone with the express or implied 
consent of the employee. Such monitoring would be illegal in the twelve states that require all 
parties to a communication to consent to the interception. Ohm, supra note, at 1485. The states 
that require the consent of all parties to a communication are California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington. Id. at 1486 n. 379.  
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State lawmakers should consider adopting long-arm statutes that would 
enable courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign app developers. One 
approach is to adopt a long-arm provision that permits prosecutors to pursue 
defendants whose software has harmed its citizens or whose services host data 
in the state.155 
 
If lawmakers decline to adopt criminal law reforms, lawmakers could 
consider imposing record-keeping requirements for spyware providers that 
know or have reason to know are used for secret surveillance. Sellers would be 
required to keep records of purchases, including detailed information about 
their users. We saw record-keeping requirements in the FTC’s consent decree 
in the CyberSpy case. The FTC and state agencies should be given oversight 
over record-keeping requirements and the power to seek civil penalties against 
violators. Criminal penalties could follow if record-keeping requirements are 
not followed.156  
 
Record-keeping requirements could help deter criminal activity. Because 
providers would have to keep records about their customers, their records 
would put them on notice that their equipment is primarily used for secret 
spying. Providers might adopt measures—such as having icons signaling the 
presence of apps—to immunize themselves from criminal liability. Individual 
perpetrators might think better of using software to spy on intimates because 
the threat of criminal penalty might seem real. Having to provide detailed 
information to providers about their identities might deter some wrongdoing.  
 
Another potential reform is to give the FTC the power to pursue civil 
penalties against entities whose devices are designed to intercept private 
communications and location data without detection. In testifying in support of 
Senator Franken’s Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014, the FTC’s Chief of 
the Bureau of Consumer Protection pressed the bill’s supporters to give the 
FTC the ability to enforce the civil penalty provision of the bill.157 Civil 
penalties could serve as a potent deterrent to stalking app producers.158  
                                                          
155  Thanks to Venus Johnson and Jeff Rabkin for talking to me about jurisdictional issues and 
potential reform efforts in California. At the federal level, prosecutors asserted their jurisdiction 
over the StealthGenie CEO on the company’s hosting of data in Virginia. 
156 A similar regulatory scheme applies to the pornography industry under 18 U.S.C. 2257. 
157 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and 
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014) (Statement of Jessica Rich, Dir., FTC 
Bureau of Consumer Protection).  
158 Legislative permission would lend democratic imprimatur to agency action. The FTC has 
faced criticism about its enforcement efforts under Section 5(a) on the grounds that the unfair 
and deceptive practices statutory language fails to provide adequate notice to defendants of 
what constitutes appropriate behavior. The Federal Trade Commission and its Section 5 Authority: 
Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 
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What about private rights of action? Under current law, parties who 
know that they have been spied upon likely cannot sue the companies that 
enable the privacy invasions.159 A main barrier to recovery in common law tort 
cases is courts’ refusal to recognize privacy harms as justiciable or cognizable in 
the absence of financial harm.160 State and federal lawmakers could overcome 
these problems by recognizing a statutory private right of action against 
entities providing, selling, and advertising devices designed to secretly 
intercept communications and location data.  
 
What about concerns that legal reform will impede innovation? The 
legal agenda proposed here is not designed to impede legitimate business 
practices. In our digital age, personal data is routinely collected, processed, and 
shared. Behavioral advertisers personalize ads based on online browsing habits. 
Social networks amass reservoirs of personal data including user-provided 
location information and message histories. These entities engage in these 
practices for commercial purposes, whether to sell advertising or to enhance 
user experiences, not for illegal ends. The FTC common law has set forth basic 
fair information practice principles, including notice and transparency for the 
collection, use, and sharing of consumer data. Such practices can and should 
proceed if consumers are given clear and prominent notice of these practices.   
 
These commercial enterprises have little in common with businesses that 
enable domestic abusers to spy on another person’s private communications 
and location without detection. They sell tools that enable the continuous and 
secret tracking of a person’s communications and location by private spies. 
Spying Incorporated is distinct from commercial practices with beneficial, 
legitimate uses, and so in turn are the civil and criminal penalties that attach to 
it. 
B. Enforcement Efforts 
 
Without question, a legal agenda must be paired with support for law 
enforcement. Law enforcement needs access to digital forensic expertise and 
training about existing law. Police officers need to better understand the 
dangers of stalking apps, investigatory techniques, and available laws.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
113th Cong. (July 24, 2014) (statement of Prof. Gerard M. Stegmaier), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Stegmaier-Statement-7-24-
FTC.pdf. 
159 Luis v. Zang, Nos. 1:11–cv–884, 1:12–cv–629 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2013), available at 2013 WL 
811816 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2520 did not provide a private right of action for Section 2512 
violations). 
160 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). 
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In a world of limited resources, the difficulty is identifying additional 
funding sources. It is expensive to hire digital forensics experts for each and 
every local police force. One possibility is for localities to join together to 
allocate money for digital forensic resources. Another is for localities to obtain 
funding from the Department of Justice. Local law enforcement agencies could 
share access to experts. Another potential source of funding is the monetary 
penalties stemming from convictions under Section 2512 and similar state laws. 
To the extent that Section 2512 and similar state laws are enforced, the fines 
collected from convicted defendants could be diverted to funding digital 
forensic specialists.  
 
Another avenue to encourage enforcement is the mandatory collection of 
statistics about investigations and prosecutions of Section 2512 and state laws. 
Mandatory reporting rules would help shine light on what law enforcement is 
and is not doing to combat cyber stalking app providers. Interested advocacy 
groups could bring publicity to gaps in enforcement, garnering the interest of 
elected officials including district attorneys. 
 
C. Private Sector Solutions  
 
To be sure, legislative reform may move slowly and the enforcement of 
existing criminal law may make only small advances in the near term. Private 
sector providers could help envision other solutions. Apple and Google are 
moving to end-to-end encryption to deal with governmental intrusion. 
Smartphone manufacturers and ISPs might adopt technologies to prevent the 
installation of spyware without the consent of the device owner. There may 
indeed be consumer demand for such a move. We have seen public support for 
encrypted cell phones to resist the spying eyes of government. There may be 
strong consumer demand for devices that are not vulnerable to spyware. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The time to strike against stalking apps and their ilk is now. With the 
increasing adoption of biometric technologies, wearable monitors, and 
networked home devices, our cell phones will amass an unimaginably rich 
record of our lives. As spyware proliferates, stalkers, domestic abusers, and 
identity thieves will have access to those intimate reservoirs of our personal 
data. The consequences will be grave. We need to confront the issue with all 
potential tools, including criminal and civil penalties. The private sector can 
play its role as well, for the good of consumers and society.  
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